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Expression over Content
An examination of the language of international law
In this short piece I will argue that international law, in order 
to gain access to its revolutionary potential, needs to create a 
new linguistic opening. This linguistic opening needs to be 
located within the expression as opposed to content of 
international law. In this sense this piece is not situated on 
the continuum of the existing international law and literature 
studies. It also develops an argument different from widely 
known writings of such scholar as Martti Koskenniemi, David 
Kennedy and others working within a similar tradition, who 
all focus on the interpretation and analysis of the language of 
international law and more specifically its content. Another 
note of caution relates to the understanding of the term 
‘expression’ as used in this piece. While traditionally the 

content is opposed to form, as many binaries content and 
form shape each other and are interdependent. Expression is 
not related to any particular form but at the same time 
destroys our traditional understanding of content. It is not 
devoid of content in the sense of being meaningless, but it 
opens an access to another, different way of communicating. 
It is precisely this different way of communicating that is able 
to bring about a revolutionary change.
In order to develop the argument, I use the reflections on 
minor literature developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari in a short essay entitled ‘ Kafka: Towards a Minor 
Literature’ (Gilles Deleuze and Félixe Guattari, Kafka: pour 
une litérature mineure (Les éditions de minuit, 1975). 
Translated into English as Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1986)).
Minor literature and revolutionary use of language
Deleuze and Guattari start by emphasising something that 
today appear common knowledge, namely that language is 
not a-political. However, they develop this idea to the 
extreme and affirm that every single instance of using a 
language, any language, puts in motion political forces. These 
forces can operate to maintain the status quo and thus 
exclusions and injustices or contest them. When operating as 
a contestation force, language can tend to create new 
hierarchies by simply reversing the power structures or can 
work towards dismantling of power structures as such. This 
is what Deleuze and Guattari call revolutionary use of 
language. Every language creates multiple centres of power. 
To change the power balance we need to change the use of 
language. According to Deluze and Guattari one of the 
revolutionary uses of language is exemplified by Kafka’s work 
and labelled as minor use of language or minor literature. 
Minor literature as interpreted by Deleuze and Guttari does 
not designate any specific type of literature or literary genre 
but ‘the revolutionary conditions for every literature within 
the heart of what is called great (or established) literature’ 
(18). According to Deleuze and Guattari the following are the 
three characteristics of the minor literature:
• ‘the deterritorialization of language,
• the connection of the individual to a political immediacy,
• and the collective assemblage of enunciation.’ (18)
Intensive usage of language (expression)
Within the context of this short piece it is not possible to 
detail all these characteristics. Therefore, I will focus on one 
that is related to deterritorialisation, namely the intensive 
usage of language where expression precedes content. This 
is what was meant by the linguistic opening within the 
expression of international law. Deterritorialisation is a 
complex notion that is developed by Deleuze in Guattari in 
various works. To illustrate it for the purposes of this piece, 
we can think of the examples, used by Deleuze and Guattari 
themselves: a Czech Jew writing in German, or an Ouzbekian 
in Russian (18). Deterritorialisation of language always 
operates to subvert the existing hierarchies of power. 
However, the forces contained within language will always 
attempt at reterritorialising the language, e.g. by creating a 
new power structure, a new hierarchy. (19) It is in this 
context that Deleuze and Guattari ask what is the type of 
deterritorialisation that will allow depositing all power. They 
answer this question by identifying the purely intensive 
usage of language as one that by ‘pushing deterritorialisation 
to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities’ (19) 
deposits all power. This intensive usage is defined in 
opposition to ‘all symbolic or even significant or simply 
signifying usages of it’ (19). In this usage expression precedes 
content. Among the examples of this intensive usage of 
language Deleuze and Guattari mention are the following: use 
of sounds that do not belong to language of a sense nor 
represent a music or melody (21); use of prenominal or purely 
intensive verbs, conjunctions, exclamation and terms that 
connote pain (22); or very expressively: ‘To use a syntax in 
order to cry, to give a syntax to the cry.’ (26) These are just a 
few examples, but importantly, intensive usage of language, 
precedence of expression over content allows a direct and 
immediate access to emotion, feeling and lived experience of 
people.
The language of international law
International law operates mostly in English language with 
strict disciplinary conventions of writing. This certainly does 
create power imbalances in favour of native English speakers. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of minor 
literature teaches us that operating in a native or foreign 
language does not determine the outcomes, although being a 
non-native speaker can potentially provide more avenues for 
a revolutionary use of language. What is determining is how 
we use the language. One can become a foreigner, a nomad 
in his/her own language by being aware of consequences of 
our uses of language.
International law that operates with strict conventions about 
appropriateness of certain types of writing only – and here I 
mean the whole body of written production from scholarly 
articles and monographs to judgments and treaties – cannot 
experience this revolutionary movement if it does not 
enlarge the range of different usages of language that are 
accepted within the discipline. Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasise that even a major language (like the English of 
international law) ‘is open to an intensive utilization that 
makes it take flight along creative lines of escape which, no 
matter how slowly, no matter how cautiously, can now form 
an absolute deterritorialisation.’ (26) They also emphasise 
that non-native speakers can be particularly skilful in this 
intensive usage of language. Taking into account how many 
people involved with international law have to operate in a 
language that is not their own, potentially there are many 
opportunities for international law to discover its new 
linguistic opening. However, so far any person who wants to 
speak to international law or wants to speak about 
international law has to acquire the standard international 
law language. People from linguistic minorities or indigenous 
people or those who simply are not used to the language of 
international law can only get access to international law 
through an intermediary either of a person who will speak on 
their behalf in the standard language or of a language that 
they artificially adopt.
Conclusions
I am persuaded that a careful reading of this short essay by 
Deleuze and Guattari makes clear that without changing, 
without attempting to change the way we use language in 
international law, we will always be caught within the same 
circles and interrogations, with the same problems that we 
re-discuss infinite number of times. The new in international 
law and especially any revolutionary change will be 
impossible as long as the current conventional linguistic 
practices remain unchallenged and centred on however 
critical discussion of content without creating an opening for 
expression. As long as the conventional linguistic practices 
remain unchallenged power imbalance and injustice that are 
part of the structure of international law will also remain and 
international law will never be able to come closer to its 
promise of justice.
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